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aBsTracT
This paper analyses the role played by myths in Francesco Patrizi’s Dialoghi della retorica 
(1562). In the discussion of  the tenets of  classical rhetoric contained in the work, Patrizi 
aims to define both the matter and the form of  the discipline through the analysis of  
the nature of  language and the limits of  human knowledge. Patrizi uses some stories 
where fiction and history are intertwined to provide a mythical explanation of  the 
causes behind the first decay of  human social, political and intellectual life. Therefore, 
the present contribution will focus on Patrizi’s approach to reforming language in its 
rhetorical dimension, and will determine what role is reserved for fiction in the Dialogues 
on Rhetoric. In other words, I will try to respond with Patrizi to the following question: 
What meaning can fiction offer when language is employed as a way of  accessing truth?
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resumen
Este artículo estudia el papel desempeñado por los mitos en los Diálogos sobre la retórica 
(1562) de Francesco Patrizi. En la discusión sobre los principios de la retórica clásica 
contenida en la obra, Patrizi define tanto el objeto como la forma de la disciplina a 
través del análisis del lenguaje y de los límites del conocimiento. Para ello, Patrizi se 
vale de algunas narraciones donde ficción e historia aparecen entremezcladas a fin de 
ofrecer una explicación mítica de las causas que condujeron a la primera decadencia 
de la humanidad en lo social, en lo político y en lo intelectual. Así, estás páginas se 
ocuparán de la aproximación de Patrizi a la reforma del lenguaje en su dimensión 
retórica y del papel que le asigna a la ficción en los Diálogos de la retórica. Dicho de otra 
manera, intentaré responder con Patrizi a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Qué significado pue-
de ofrecer la ficción cuando se hace valer al lenguaje como vía de acceso a la verdad?
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In recent decades, the figure of  the Platonist philosopher Francesco Patrizi 
da Cherso has been investigated from various points of  view.1 His major treatise, 
Nova de Universis Philosophia (Patrizi 1591),2 is a proposal for a radical reform 
of  knowledge and teaching, and constitutes an interesting turning point in the 
late 16th century debate against Aristotelianism and its overwhelming presence 
in the European universities for more than three hundred years. However, his 
multifarious body of  work had begun in the 1550s with a Platonic commentary on 
Petrarch’s sonnet La gola il sonno et l’ocïose plume, a short hermetic utopia praising the 
Venetian state, a dialogue on honour and an exposition of  the Platonic doctrine 
of  the frenzies (Patrizi 1553).3 His philosophical production during the second 
half  of  the century can be summarized in two major concerns of  his ambitious 
project. On the one hand, the restoration of  ancient wisdom (antiqua sapientia), 
dating back to the teaching of  Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus as well as that 
of  Moses; and, on the other, the reform of  language in its rhetorical, poetical 
and gnoseological dimensions. The first would result in a new way of  considering 
the relationship between metaphysical truth and the investigation of  the natural 
world; the second would reintroduce language as a tool of  ‘scientific’ knowledge, 
capable of  linking words (verba) to things (res). The latter is one of  the most 
important themes in his dialogues published in Venice at the beginning of  the 
60s, continues in his ambitious research on poetics (Patrizi 1969–71), and deeply 
influences the conception and forms of  the Nova Philosophia itself.
The present contribution will closely follow this path of  Patrizi’s philosophy, 
paying special attention to the Della retorica dieci dialoghi, published by Francesco 
Senese in 1562 (Patrizi 1562). This will allow us to determine the role reserved for 
fiction, both in this work and in Patrizi’s project as a whole, and will offer some 
insights on the value he conceded to fiction as a linguistic tool to access truth.
1. dIaloguIng
The Dialoghi della retorica are conceived as a general reflection on the nature of  
rhetoric, based on the analysis of  the ancient doctrines dedicated to the topic. On 
1 Among the most relevant contributions on Patrizi: Bolzoni, Deitz, Leinkauf, Muccillo, Plastina, 
Vasoli 1989.
2 Preparatory work had been done in the Discussiones Peripateticae, whose books 1 and 2 had been 
published in Venice in 1571 (Patrizi 1571), the complete version in 4 books being published 
Basel 1581 (Patrizi 1581). 
3 On Patrizi’s philosophical work see in particular Vasoli 1989 and the bibliography contained there.
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the frontispiece, Patrizi’s position is said to be in contrast with the ancient opinions 
(“con ragioni repugnanti all’openione, che intorno a quella hebbero gli antichi 
scrittori,” see fig. 1), but the dedication to Nicolò Sfrondati, bishop of  Cremona 
at that time, underlines at the same time the importance of  the confrontation 
with the past in Patrizi’s perspective (“Al molto ill. Sig. Nicolo Sfrondato […] 
Francesco Patritio queste sue fatiche sopra la retorica degli antichi, principio della 
sua retorica, da, dona, et dedica,” see fig. 2).4
As a critic of  ancient theories of  rhetoric, Patrizi could have chosen other 
genres of  writing rather than dialogue. His work could have assumed the form 
of  a commentary if  he had chosen to focus on other authors’ interpretation; or, 
had he wished to focus on the innovative character of  his own doctrine, he could 
have produced a systematic treatise methodically expounding his new perspective. 
However, Patrizi’s preference for dialogue—which he only wrote in the vernacular—
as a tool for philosophical inquiry during the 1560s and 1570s is not a chance one, as 
he had already published his ten Dialoghi della historia two years before (Patrizi 1560), 
and he would make use of  the genre yet once more in his Amorosa filosofia, written 
in 1577 and only printed posthumously, in the 20th century (Patrizi 1963). Moreover, 
his choice of  dialogues to appraise the problems related to rhetoric is not merely a 
matter of  taste, as it entails important implications, as we shall see.
Modern scholars of  the Renaissance, as well as Patrizi’s contemporaries, have 
discussed the nature of  dialogue, considering it the result of  a mixture of  poetry, 
rhetoric and dialectic (Sigonio), prose and poetry, particularly comedy (Speroni), 
and poetry and dialectic (Tasso). In the last two cases, dialogue is considered an 
intermediate step between dialectics—seeking for the truth, i.e., philosophy—and 
rhetoric—aimed at persuasion.5 As a matter of  fact, it could be generally asserted 
that Patrizi’s dialogues aim at defining both the premises and the nature of  the 
subject under consideration. In the case of  history and rhetoric, for instance, this 
implies a critical discussion of  the current doctrines on the topic, and, as a result, 
both sets of  dialogues are moulded after a Socratic quest for true definitions. At 
an initial level, fictionality is thus introduced as the mimetic representation of  a 
conversation that could have taken place between real interlocutors, building up a 
verisimilar context for the ‘true’ dialectical quest about the subject.
4 See Muccillo, pp. 53ff; Vasoli 1989, pp. 149ff; and Vasoli 2011, pp. 245–46.
5 Zorzi Pugliese, p. 15ff. See also Girardi, p. 40ff.; Snyder, pp. 53–4, 72–5, 80, and 101–2; and 
Forno, pp. 38–58ff.; among many others. On the uses of  dialogue in Renaissance philosophy, 
see the collective volume Il dialogo filosofico edited by Bigalli and Canziani.
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The framework of  the Dialoghi della retorica in particular, is lacking any 
contextualizing element of  space or time, and the action begins in medias res with 
the first dialogue (Il Lamberto) devoted to the nature of  speaking in general.6 The 
strongest element of  verisimilitude are the eponymous characters intervening in 
the dialogues, in which Patrizi himself  always acts as an interlocutor, surrounded by 
other participants. Indirectly, touching the problem of  imitation in the figurative arts, 
he even offers per viam negationis a sort of  self-portrait, which gives physicality to his 
literary projection in the dialogue.7 Some of  the other figures are eminent scholars. 
Towards them Patrizi plays the role of  the astonished, inexperienced philosopher in 
search of  the truth, forced to consider all possible options by a sort of  ‘spirit’ and 
by the consciousness of  his own ignorance, in order to verify the appropriateness of  
the traditional teaching of  rhetoric and define the true essence of  it.
6 “Pa[tritio]. You have pronounced a nice and truthful praise of  Eloquence, Sir Giulio [Strozzi]!” 
Patrizi 1562, fol. 1r. My translation, as well as in all following cases, if  not stated otherwise. 
7 Patrizi 1562, fol. 55v.
Fig. 1 Fig. 2
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In fact, his character acquires a sort of  psychological profiling: intemperate 
as a young man, harassing his friends with unusual questions, Patrizi wants to 
stand out for the novelty and the radicality of  his research. These trends will 
persist over the years, shaping Patrizi’s method in the major works of  his maturity, 
and in the Discussiones Peripateticae (Patrizi 1581) in particular, four tomes of  
‘pedantic’ analysis of  the Aristotelian corpus. All participants are listed under the 
title on the first page of  each corresponding dialogue and some of  them are 
of  particular interest. Every dialogue is named after one of  the interlocutors, 
all real figures chosen from the Venetian and Italian cultural context for their 
particular authority in the specific field that is being appraised. Felice Figliucci, the 
first translator of  Aristotle’s Rhetoric into the vernacular,8 is for example the main 
figure in the second dialogue, devoted to considering the fields to which rhetoric 
is applicable;9 Francesco Sansovino—author, orator and publisher in Venice—
leads the discussion on rhetorical ornamentation in the fifth dialogue;10 and 
Alessandro Baranzone (Catelli)—a philosopher and physician, author of  poems, 
whom Patrizi met in Modena at the ‘court’ of  Tarquinia Molza—is introduced in 
the sixth dialogue;11 Altinieri Avogaro, the son of  Girolamo, professor of  moral 
philosophy at Padua (Quattrucci), is presented by Patrizi as a renewed philosopher 
himself  in the last of  the dialogues.12
2. The sTaTe of The arT
When facing the tradition of  rhetoric as art, Patrizi is confronted in the 
first instance with the doctrines of  Aristotle and Cicero. His strategy was to 
extrapolate some of  their assertions and juxtapose them in order to point out 
the contradictions contained in their doctrines and immediately to develop their 
implications as far as possible, in particular the places which could be interpreted 
as supporting Patrizi’s own views. Hence, there are four major points Patrizi is 
interested in when defining the nature of  rhetoric: (1.) Which fields are specific 
to rhetoric? (2.) Is there a peculiar aspect which characterizes the modes of  the 
orator? (3.) Is human rhetoric a natural gift or an art? (4.) Is it teachable?
8 Tradottione antica de la rettorica d’Aristotile nuovamente trovata, In Padova, con gratia et privilegio 
del sommo Pontefice, et dell’illustriss[imo] Senato venetiano per anni dieci, [1548].
9 Il Figliucci, overo delle materie oratorie, dialogo secondo, Patrizi 1562, fols. 8v–22r.
10 Il Sansovino, ovvero de gli ornamenti retorici. Dialogo quinto, ibid. fols. 28r–32v.
11 Il Baranzone, overo de le parti oratorie. Dialogo sesto, ibid. fols. 33r–37v.
12 L’Avogaro, overo dell’ampiezza della retorica. Dialogo decimo, ibid. fols. 57r–61v.
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2.1. Matter
As for the first problem, Patrizi faces the tradition that restricts classical 
rhetoric to three branches: deliberative oratory, judicial oratory, and epideictic 
oratory. Taking to its ultimate consequences Aristotle’s statement that rhetoric is 
the counterpart of  dialectic and that both are not confined to any specific science,13 
Patrizi maintains that there is no specific matter rhetoric must be referred to. 
Rhetoric as such can be applied to any possible subject, and the quest for the 
perfect oration is in fact the quest for the perfect form of  speech within the art 
of  language. Underlining this aspect, Patrizi claims that his own view differs from 
the position of  the “divine” Giulio Camillo Delminio, the author of  the L’Idea del 
Theatro (1550). Camillo’s project aimed to reproduce the hierarchies of  the world 
and thus organize the entirety of  human knowledge in terms of  an exhaustive 
repertoire of  rhetorical loci meant for the perfect orator. His error, in Patrizi’s mind, 
is not to have gone further, as he himself  does, in order to expand the realm of  
rhetoric beyond the limits of  the three classical branches.14
2.2. Form
In the same way as it is impossible to identify the matter of  rhetoric, likewise 
it is impossible to identify its proper form. Classical rhetoric operates appealing 
to arguments, passions, or ornaments, but all these ways are either borrowed 
from civic or dialectical applications of  speech, or else are unnecessary.15 Classical 
oratory is thus no more than a restricted application of  rhetoric, with a strong 
accent on its civic use.
One of  the most interesting contributions offered by the Dialoghi della retorica 
consists in the effort of  giving a socio-political explanation of  the history of  
these genres, later assumed as oratory tout court. Its birth and fortune, as Patrizi 
claims, is tightly bound to the rise of  the “popular regimes.”16 The forms of  
classical rhetoric could not have found appropriate space under any tyrannical 
regime, because despots are not interested in any other opinion than their own; 
and would not have found any application where written laws permitted—and 
still permit—the distinction between what is allowed and what is not, what is right 
and what is wrong; and only experts in law and government (“i dottori,” as Patrizi 
13 Rhet. I.1,1354a1.
14 Patrizi 1562, fol. 17.
15 Patrizi 1562, fol. 15v.
16 Ibid. fol. 34r ff.
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calls them) are appointed to decide in civic matters.17 As maintained by Aristotle 
himself,18 oratory was born in Sicily, under “popular regimes” after the fall of  
the tyrants, when ignorant citizens began to juxtapose themselves to each other, 
building their positions not on the firm terrain of  knowledge and science, but on 
opinions. Oratory was thus reduced to a confrontation of  opposites, and the force 
of  language was based on irrational elements and “suggestions” obtained through 
a “skilful disposition” of  words and figures.19
2.3. Nature and Art
Although speech is originally natural to man, it must be learned. Rhetoric, 
exactly as any other art, requires study and practice in order for a person to have 
full command of  it. Potentially granted to mankind, which is endowed with a 
rational soul where concepts can be produced, and with the requisite physical 
disposition (mouth, tongue, teeth) fit for producing the articulated sounds which 
characterize human speech, language must be learned through the years, in order 
to proceed from the obscure stammering of  babies to the elegant disquisitions of  
poets, philosophers, and orators.20
2.4. Teaching
The real problem is to find a proper method of  teaching the true art of  
discourse, organising the precepts according to the scheme of  the “celestial 
Rhetoric,” the rhetoric of  the things (res) which represents the way of  the divine 
“narrative speech,”21 God’s logos that created all the things of  the world.22
This notion of  “celestial rhetoric” is barely developed in the Dialoghi, although 
it can be expanded by looking at the systematic conception of  Patrizi’s later 
treatises, and the quite simple style of  his mature writing. Much more space is 
given in the Dialoghi to illustrating the causes of  the decline of  rhetoric as the 
17 Ibid. fol. 41v.
18 Cicero, Brutus 46–48. This short legend on the origins of  rhetoric soon became a 
commonplace not only in classical tradition —Cicero, De orat. II. 53; Quintilian, Inst. Or. III. 
1. 8; Athanasius of  Alexandria, Contra gentes 18; etc.—, but also in Renaissance letters, for 
instance, from Leonardo Bruni’s Prohemium in Orationes Homeri (Bruni, 64) to Sperone Speroni’s 
(1978b, p. 657) Dialogo della retorica.
19 Vasoli 1989, pp. 102–3.
20 Patrizi 1562, fol. 53r.
21 Ibid. fol. 29r.
22 See Plastina, p. 26.
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practice of  language, insisting on the weakness of  the latter in expressing the 
essence of  things.
3. hIsTory and myTh
One of  the most interesting aspects of  the Dialoghi is Patrizi’s historical and 
socio-political approach to the rise of  the classical use of  rhetoric. Patrizi stresses 
the gap between a discourse based on scientific reasons and corresponding to 
what is true and right, and a dispute which is led by passions and opinions and 
made confused and ambiguous by ornaments and tropes. In his view, the weakness 
of  the language corresponds in fact to the weakness of  knowledge itself, which is 
only certain when touching on mathematical questions, considered in their purely 
theoretical aspect.23
When looking for the most intimate causes of  the objects that he is examining, 
Patrizi’s historical presentation encounters the fascination of  mythical storytelling, 
and, at a second level, fictional creativity emerges as the best way to describe and 
explain the true nature of  things. Hence, the Dialoghi present four major myths, 
all striving to explain the importance of  language as an instrument of  knowledge 
and, paradoxically, its role in the decay of  human knowledge in general. It is worth 
noting that ‘myth’ refers in this context to a fictional story that refashions mythical 
materials, some of  its main characters being Graeco-Roman gods. The stories 
serve to explain the causes and origins of  all that pertains to human intellectual 
experience.
The first and maybe the most well-known myth in the Dialoghi concerns the 
history of  the fall of  the world. The story, introduced in the first dialogue, is narrated 
by Giulio Strozzi, who claims that it was originally told by an Ethiopian to Baldassarre 
Castiglione, the famous Italian scholar and the brother of  Strozzi’s grandmother. 
The plausibility of  the story is supported by the authority of  the intermediary and 
the antiquity of  the original source: Castiglione is said to have heard it while he 
was in Spain at the service of  the Holy See, adding that the Ethiopian claimed that 
it derived from the most ancient annals of  his country (scritta ne gli antichissimi loro 
annali), i.e., the most direct record of  any historiographical report.
Although presented within the dialogue as storytelling, the myth assumes 
in this way the weight of  a likely, non-fictitious description of  facts which took 
23 Patrizi 1562, fol. 51v. The argument is used, adapting the authority of  Aristotle (Rhet. 1417a16), 
by Sigonio (pp. 252–3) and Tasso (p. 48). See also the comments by Bolzoni, pp. 120ff.
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place in the remotest past. This effect is reinforced as the legend was told to the 
“Count” (Castiglione himself) by the Ethiopian, and now is related by Strozzi 
to his interlocutors.24 Another important aspect to bear in mind is that, at the 
beginning of  his speech, Strozzi warns his audience that there will be people who 
will consider the whole as a tale; only “well advised” people (le persone di consiglio), 
will be “held in marvelment” and will be able to catch its real sense (la porteranno in 
molta maraviglia).25 Patrizi is thus claiming that Strozzi will make use of  a language 
capable of  causing enchantment, as the most noble language of  antiquity did, 
but he is also underlining the fact that the message would only be understood 
by those who belong to the tight circle of  people who possess a certain grade 
of  knowledge and are disposed to listen and learn. The myth, in fact, explains 
and veils at the same time, following the hermeneutics of  the whole Platonic-
Hermetic tradition.26
The Ethiopian legend occurs in a remote time—“after the last renovation” of  
the world marked by long cosmic cycles—when there was no distance between 
Earth and Heaven: the Earth was so large that it occupied all the space under the 
ether of  “purest fire.” The natural place of  the elements was not hierarchically 
organized; rather, air, water and fire were “spread all around” (erano sparsi quà, et 
là) and occupied the vast caves that spread over the surface of  the Earth as well 
as underneath it. Fire illuminated and warmed the deepest spaces, too remote to 
receive the light and warmth of  Heaven. The Earth was a sort of  “sponge” and 
its cosmic as well as orographic connotations showed its proximity to Heaven. 
Men lived there in the same way as “worms” do nowadays. Although comparable 
to small, weak animals, mankind could nevertheless profit from the surrounding 
world, and could live in peace “without war, nor sedition, nor hate” in perfect 
communion among humans and beasts, “in dialogue and brotherhood.”27 There 
were no cities, because there was no enemy from which to be protected; men 
and beasts lived together and the fields spontaneously offered them what they 
needed. This familiar conversation with beasts, plants and spirits made all men 
understand, “but in particular those who dwelled nearest to the Heaven,”28 that 
24 “Now listen carefully, Count, said the Ethiopian […]” (Ora ascolta, o Conte disse l’Ethiopo 
intentamente […]), Patrizi 1562, fol. 6r.
25 I use here the term chosen by Deitz, p. 149. 
26 See Puliafito 2011b, pp. 380-81.
27 Patrizi 1562, fol. 5v.
28 Among them the Ethiopians, the Egyptians, the Persians and the Thracians, who occupy an 
important place in the transmission of  the antiqua sapientia (Patrizi 1562, fol. 6r).
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there is nothing bad in the world. The senses of  these ancient predecessors were 
of  the purest kind. Thanks to the influence of  the stars, they had knowledge of  
everything belonging to Earth and Heaven, and were aware of  the “virtues” (virtù) 
and the “power” (potenze) of  things, so they were able to work wonders.29
But the awareness of  their knowledge and power made some of  them feel 
too proud, and the Abyssians, in particular, “deviating from the path of  reason” 
were overcome by pride, considering themselves to be gods, and thus began 
competing with Saturn. At first, the old and wise god showed no concern, but 
afterward he decided to stop illuminating their minds as he had done for so long.30 
“Pride,” “ignorance,” and “arrogance” grew so great that men tried to climb 
to the sky and conquer Saturn’s realm. Well aware of  all this, Saturn decided to 
leave the governance to his son Jupiter. This latter, “born to action” as he was, 
struck the Earth with his lightning, while his brother Pluto shook it from the 
roots. This caused the Earth to collapse and shrink: it fell away from Heaven, 
and the elements took their ‘natural’ place according to their density.31 The tragic 
passage from the realm of  Chronos to that of  Zeus, mentioned in Plato’s Politicus 
(268e–274e), substantiated here with biblical echoes, takes the form of  the physical 
transformation of  the Earth, which also becomes the representation of  the ruin 
of  the human race and the collapse of  its knowledge. The story tells about the 
formation of  mountains, the birth of  rivers and seas, the appearing of  islands 
and the disappearing of  the golden and silver trees, whose seeds are now kept in 
the womb of  the Earth, together with the rest of  the gems that once covered it. 
They remind us now of  that remote past, and hence our present valuation and 
admiration for them.32
The ruin of  the Earth entails the ruin of  man. The story tells us that most 
men perished, among them the Abyssians. They were killed not only by Jupiter’s 
thunderbolt and by the earthquakes caused by his brother, but also by the 
29 Ibid. fol. 6r.
30 “Ma andando inanzi, la color soperbia, et l’orgoglio, adiratosi egli fieramente, privògli de 
gli influssi della sua mente, co quali, egli li tenia satolli, di purissimo intelletto. Da questa 
privatione, crebbe in loro l’ignoranza et da lei l’orgoglio, et l’insolenza,” ibid. fol. 6r.
31 Ibid. fol. 6v.
32 “Et sono elle, per la memoria di quella prima età, hoggidi havute in tanto pregio; et come 
antichissime cose, ammirate, et riverite,” ibid. fol. 6v. It is interesting that there is a mention 
of  the existence of  fossils, explained as animals and human beings imprisoned in the most 
superficial parts of  the Earth after the fall, and transformed by weight and coolness into 
“marble,” “porphyry,” “alabaster,” and “serpentine” (ibid. fol. 6v). 
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subsequent terror of  those events.33 Fear entered thus into human life, determining 
the future of  mankind. After having made use of  mythical materials for telling a 
story which also provides, as it happens, a verisimilar explanation of  the actual 
physical aspect of  the Earth, Patrizi resorts to it again in order to explain the most 
profound roots of  the human attitude towards nature and knowledge. The story 
continues, as a matter of  fact, telling us about the impact on private, political and 
social life of  the terror generated by the horrendous catastrophe. After days of  
unconsciousness the survivors return to their lives, but soon realize they are now 
subjected to illness, and more quickly confronted with death; they begin to wander 
over the world, and gather together according to their different species. Herds and 
villages thus share the same origins, and the separation of  different human groups 
is shown to have the same roots as that which separates men and beasts. For man 
in particular, the joy of  living with his fellow man, remembering a peaceful past 
is counterbalanced by an increasing hate against the ‘others.’34 Even reproduction 
is interpreted as a tool of  defense, as a way to reinforce the support against the 
others.35 And the same feelings are transmitted to all the following generations.
In his truly dark description of  the origins of  civilisation, Patrizi recognizes 
fear, hate, and the desire for revenge as very primordial affections informing human 
relations to the ‘others,’ whether men or beasts.36 Moreover, as an effect of  their long 
unconsciousness, men lose their knowledge of  the things: what remains is a shadowy 
sight “through a thick veil,” just “shaded with the colour of  truth.”37 The few who still 
preserve the knowledge of  something are frightened of  making use of  it, recalling the 
causes of  the fall, and worried about the possible reaction of  the others to this use.
33 “Et di quelli, che habitarono nelle parti di fuori, per lo horrendo scotimento di sotto, et pel 
terribile fragor di sopra, et per lo crolar, che fecero all’ingiu, per gran numero di miglia, infinite 
migliaia, ne morirono di spavento,” ibid. fol. 6v.
34 “Ma dopo la gran disaventura, secondo, ch’essi s’incontravano per lo mondo, così 
s’abbracciavano, et si metteano insieme, sì per dolcezza della memoria della passata loro felicità, 
et sì per lo timore preso, parendo loro, che più sicuri stessero, tra’l proprio lignaggio, che se si 
fossero, con altra spetie mescolati. Nelle quali tutte era parimente lo spavento entrato. Et tali 
facea congregare insieme. Et questi furono gli animali di greggie. Et tali spinse in disperatione: 
et perciò arrabbiarono, in offesa de stranieri,” ibid. fol. 7r.
35 “Et allhora nacque, in tutti, desiderio di prole; procurandosi ogniuno, aiuto di se medesimo, 
et delle proprie membra,” ibid.
36 “Il quale, è la vera radice, di tutti i mali, et di tutti gli infortuni a tutti gli animali. Ma più, ch’in 
altri, rimase ne gli huomini lo spavento doppio, et da gli animali, et da se stessi,” ibid.
37 “Et se pure par loro, di vedere alcuna cosa, la veggono essi per oltre a un denso velo. Et 
di vere, che i primi padri, le conosceano, le conoscono essi, adombrate di color di vero,” ibid.
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At this point, the story itself  provides the justification of  its own literary 
form: frightened by the consequences of  the arrogant pride of  the first men, the 
few who still retained knowledge decided to keep and teach the little portions of  
science remaining through “enigmas, tales, numbers, kept from the sight of  the 
multitude.” On the other side, the “princes” and those “who wanted to exercise 
their power in the world” decided to follow “the opinions of  the vulgar folk, 
knowing how far they are from the truth, and [for the very same reason] from any 
danger.”38 The birth of  the modern state followed on: men circumscribed with 
hedges and copses the space where they lived in groups “like steer herds;” they 
chose the eldest among them to rule the community and their will became law for 
them; the division among families grew, all properties (le robbe), communal before, 
were divided and “love disappeared” (si partì l’amore). In their desire to increase 
their wealth, the “sordidness” of  men grew and money was invented with the 
hope that it would help in “prolonging” life. “Machination” and “deceit” caused 
disorder in the world, and “wit” produced “new arts” to defeat the others. As the 
most clever became more audacious, the others became more frightened. The 
latter decided at the end to gather their forces and to “invent the names of  peace 
and justice,”39 erecting temples in their honour and adoring them as gods.
The power of  the new empty words, “assembled in long chains,” was used to 
bind peace and justice, and “the frightened” called the chains “laws” and put them 
in the hands of  judges and magistrates, whose task was “to detain those Goddesses 
made of  wind.”40 The town where civic questioning gave birth to rhetoric is in 
Patrizi’s eyes the town of  disputing factions: the “frightened” disputing among 
themselves and against the “audacious,” and the “most audacious” disputing against 
everyone, in the immutable circle that rules governments. “So lived the societies—
Patrizi claims—in those times, and continue to live today, and will live in the future, 
38 “Et quindi è parimente che i Principi, et gli altri, ch’hanno voluto poter molto al mondo; 
hanno seguito le credenze de gli huomini volgari, sappiendo, elle essere lontanissime dal vero, 
et dal periglio,” Patrizi 1562, fol. 7r.
39 “Inventarono il nome della pace, et della giustitia,” ibid. fol. 7v.
40 “Tesserono appresso, molte, et lunghe catene di parole, con le quali, legando la giustitia, et 
la pace, per gli piedi, per le braccia, et pel traverso, et per lo collo, in mille guise annodandole 
andarono, accioché elle, delle loro città non dipartissero, raccomandando i capi delle catene, che 
essi addimandarono leggi, in mano ad huomini del loro animo, et paurosi. I quali nominarono 
giudici, et magistrati. Si perché essi sentissero, se quelle Dee, si come di vento fatte, et leggiere, 
volessero fuggirsi, et le ritenessero,” ibid. fol. 7v.
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in continuous transmission, passing from hand to hand.”41 The celebrated birth 
of  deliberative rhetoric was nothing more than the attempt of  “the frightened” 
to defend their interests against “the audacious;” as for judicial rhetoric, it was the 
attempt to defend themselves before a judge.42
The story ends with this disillusioned reflection on human society, where 
speech aims to defeat and chain up adversaries and “Goddesses made of  wind” 
concealing the truth. Concluding his speech, Strozzi stresses that this story causes 
“stupor” in any man of  intellect.43 The fascination aroused is not the joyful 
enchantment caused by “marvelment” (maraviglia), but a conscious sense of  fear.44 
It is worth noting that Patrizi did not return to a systematic treatment of  the 
concept of  maraviglia until 25 years later, in his Deca Ammirabile, a section of  
his Poetica, written in 1587 but published in the 20th century (Patrizi 1969–71). 
Nevertheless, in the Dialoghi we can already read that there are four “modalities” 
(maniere) of  speaking: one directed to reason, one directed to pleasure, one 
directed to passions, and one intended to evince maraviglia. The latter thus does 
not respond to reason nor to the senses. Its middle position between the two 
would be discussed thoroughly in the just-mentioned Deca Ammirabile.45
Specifically, Patrizi would come back to the ‘history’ of  language two more 
times. In the first case, its decay is explained as a consequence of  the development 
of  eloquence. Presenting his position as the testimony of  an ancient magus—
and connecting here once more fable and history, fiction and experience—Patrizi 
claims that the formal cause of  the decay of  language was eloquence itself. In the 
Nova de Universis Philosophia, Patrizi will maintain that language is, at one and the 
same time, the strength of  human beings and their weakness.46 It is their strength 
because no other animal has such a powerful tool at its disposal: among all natural 
41 “Et così andarono, fino a que’ tempi, le compagnie de gli huomini, et vanno di presente, et 
anderanno per l’avvenire, valicando sempre, et mutandosi, et passando d’una in altra mano,” 
ibid. fol. 8r.
42 “Et allhora, che i paurosi si ristrinsero insieme, per ritrovar riparo contra i più potenti, 
nacque il favellatore di consiglio. Et quando li chiamarono in giudicio, nacque il favellatore di 
giudicio,” ibid. fol. 8r.
43 “Questa vi è adunque o Patritio pien di stupore, la grande historia, che al Conte mio 
raccontò il savio Abissino, degna di altissimo stupore, d’ogni alta mente,” ibid.
44 On the different use in Patrizi of  maraviglia and stupor, see Puliafito 2017.
45 On the nature of  the “maraviglia” as the effect of  real poetry, based in Patrizi’s view not on 
mimesis—as maintained by the Aristotelians—but on the “wonderful” (mirabile), see Leinkauf  
and Deitz. 
46 Patrizi 1591, fol. 58v.
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 4, n.º 2 (2017): 243-263
Anna Laura Puliafito256
forms of  communication—from the implicit language of  Nature through the 
gestures and the unarticulated sounds of  animals—human language is capable 
of  a depth, a complexity, and an elegance that no other (natural) language will 
ever approach; but on the other side, man is condemned to study language and 
thoroughly exercise it before mastering this powerful tool, while any other animal 
is able to make full use of  its faculty from birth to death.47 In the fifth of  the 
dialogues the magus warns his pupil that it is the learned use of  language, whose 
elegant traps had their origin in societies after the fall caused by the arrogance 
of  some, that has deprived words of  their marvelous power.48 The roughness of  
the original language (haveano il più dello aspro et dello strepitoso) has been polished 
and refined, but smoothness and elegance (l’eleganza, et la dolcezza del favellare) 
have caused distinctions between the uses of  the different groups; the original, 
common tongue has split into a thousand different tongues, to the point that not 
one of  the original words can be now traced and recognized.49 The interest in 
“smoothness of  pronounciation”—which Patrizi possibly considers the only real 
peculiarity of  the ars oratoria—, cultivated in tribunals and courts, has produced the 
same effect as did the Tower of  Babel, and knowledge has disappeared, together 
with the power of  speech. Sansovino, Patrizi’s interlocutor in this dialogue, is not 
convinced by the story of  the magus, and explicitly requires the “reasons” behind 
Patrizi’s tenets: “These are not more than ‘novelle’ […] invented by your magus in 
order to cheat you; what you really need is to find the reasons which can force us 
to believe what you believe.”50
In the second reference to the ‘history’ of  language, Patrizi once more depicts 
its origin and advancement following the uses of  speech. The narrator is still the 
figure of  the young Patrizi, who reports an old story, “which for its antiquity will 
be seen as a fable composed by poets, but which I [Patrizi] consider to be a true 
story.”51 It is the story of  “the Wind, son of  the Air” (il Vento figliuol dell’Aria) who 
47 Puliafito 2011a, pp. 133ff. On animals’ communication see also Prins, pp. 342ff.
48 “Che beato il mondo, s’egli non vi si fossero introdotti, tanti ornamenti de parlari, […] i 
quali ci hanno oscurato la scienza delle cose,” Patrizi 1562, fol. 31v.
49 “Intanto, che noi ci siamo hoggimai, della naturale lingua dimenticati affatto, et non 
riconosciamo più, sol’una delle primiere voci,” ibid. fol. 31r.
50 “San[sovino]: Coteste sono novelle, o Patrizio, che il vostro mago si diede a fingere per 
gabbo: ma e’ bisogna, che voi troviate ragioni, le quali ci possano tirare quasi a forza nella 
vostra credenza,” ibid. fol. 31v.
51 “Et io adunque vi dirò cosa, che per la sua antichità, vi parrà favola da poeti. ma io l’ho per 
cosa vera,” ibid. fol. 43r.
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“fell in love with human words and carnally joined them on the bed of  human 
language” (innamoratosi fieramente delle parole humane, hebbe prattica con loro, in sul letto 
del’humana lingua). They gave birth to Fame, “who had wings like her mothers” 
(nacque di tal padre, et madri invisibili, una invisibile figliuola, chiamata Fama. La quale, 
si come di madri alate nata, hebbe l’ali). During the first youth of  the world, the girl 
did not receive much attention, but then, having reported to Jupiter a conspiracy 
organized by the “strongest sons of  Earth”—the Giants indeed helped by Juno, 
offended by her husband’s continuous betrayals—Fame obtained from the 
god the gift of  “dispensing immortality to writings,” of  “flying to the sky,” of  
“mixing” the true and false that she was able to collect, “like a bee,” from human 
mouths.52 She was moreover appointed to represent the God of  Gods by all the 
Princes of  the Earth, and to serve them according to their interests. As a loving 
child attending to a request, she took care of  her grandfathers and uncles, the 
orators, and offered them the celebrity and immortality orators would have never 
deserved.53
The ‘historical’ explanation of  the origins of  rhetoric continues with a 
particular reference to the inception of  sophistry. In this case Patrizi puts on stage 
Prodicus of  Ceos, revisiting his oration concerning the choice of  Hercules between 
virtue and vice.54 This time the young Patrizi claims to report what he has seen 
“in a sort of  dream” (in guisa di sogno), but can nevertheless be testified in the “old 
histories” (nelle storie antiche). In his ‘report,’ Patrizi personifies Prodicus’s oration, 
presenting it as the “legitimate daughter” of  “one of  those ancient fathers of  
Rhetoric” and his Art.55 In the story, the “virtue” as well as the “sensual pleasure” 
offered by Prodicus’s oration take the form of  two beautiful girls, contending 
with words for the love of  the young Hercules—who, as is known, will prefer the 
hard way proposed by virtue to the easy way of  pleasure and vice. Prodicus began 
travelling from one city to another with his beautiful daughter, showing the girl 
52 “Et alla fama rivelatrice del fatto, diede per dono, che tutte le cose, che ella segnasse col 
suo sigillo in lettere, fossero immortali […]. Che volasse per le bocche degli huomini, in guisa 
d’ape. Et cogliesse il fior del falso, et del vero parimente; et mesco-latigli in suo modo insieme 
[…],” ibid. fol. 43v.
53 “Et perché ella figliuola fu delle parole, delle quali per poco, sono gli oratori padri, o fratelli; 
ella si come amorevole nipote, gli ha consecrati alla immortalità; improntando il suo sigillo, a 
molti loro libri. Et quindi è, che essi sono di cotanto grido, al mondo, et non d’altronde,” ibid. 
54 See, among others, Xenophon’s Memorabilia, II.1, 21–34.
55 “Prodico Chio, uno di que’ gran padri antichi, della Retorica, ingravidando legittimamente 
la figliuola, ne fece nascere, una oratione,” ibid. fol. 16v.
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“naked” everywhere, which gained him huge profits, particularly in Thebes, for 
the presence in the city of  Hercules himself, and in Sparta, where “victory was still 
in the hands of  virtue, whom the citizens of  the town loved more than any other 
women, following her laws that Lycurgus had entrusted to them.”56 Hearing about 
his success and his profits, Gorgias the sophist became envious of  Prodicus, and 
so entered the theatre in Athens, inviting everybody to ask him about anything 
they wished. Gorgias became rich and famous, in his turn, and the example 
of  the two was followed by many others all over the world. Oratory was thus 
exercised in three forms: “extemporaneous, prepared, or written” (all’improviso, o 
pensatamente, o in iscrittura). And because of  their particular success in this special 
field, orations became in the end mostly restricted to the three classical branches. 
Patrizi presents the story as a sort of  dream which suddenly came to his mind, 
but which is reported by the ancient histories, and the psychological balance in his 
description of  the spread of  oratory is underlined by the use of  small phrases of  
direct speech, in particular from Gorgias to his audience as well as to himself.57 
The historical development of  oratory is in sharp contrast to its universality of  
extent—the thing Patrizi is pleading for.58
The narration of  the rise and fall of  language ends with a consideration of  
the state of  human knowledge, so deeply dependent on the use of  language and 
words. In this instance, too the story is told in dialogue by the author, who admits 
to giving “the form of  a tale” to what was “maybe true.”59 We are then taken back 
to the beginning of  the reign of  Jupiter, when the god wanted to be adored by all 
creatures. He elicited the respect of  all other gods, but desired to be worshipped 
also by the creatures of  the Earth. However, he decided not to leave Olympus, 
and sent to the Earth his best sculptor, Prometheus, asking him to give form to a 
simulacrum of  himself, following his own proportions. Prometheus did what he 
was asked, and made it alive, but “fell in love” with his own creation and desired 
56 “A Sparta, perché la vittoria era restata in mano alla virtù, la quale gli Spartani allhora amavano 
sopra ogni altra donna. et si essercitavano, nelle leggi di lei, commesse loro da Licurgo,” ibid.
57 See in particular Patrizi 1562, fol. 16v (“[…] disse tra sé, che sarà adunque d’huomo, che 
di tutte le cose parli? ardì, in presenza del pieno Teatro d’Atene, di gridare con franca voce. 
Proponete”).
58 In this sense Patrizi recalls more than once the positions of  Giulio Camillo, who nevertheless 
could not sufficiently distance himself  from the traditional views on oratory and so tried no 
more than to “squeeze into a little cup the waters of  the whole Ocean” (“l’acque di tutto 
l’Oceano, stringere in una picciol coppa,” ibid. fol. 17v). 
59 “Io’ l vi dirò in maniera di favola, ma e’ fu peraventura vero,” ibid. fol. 51v.
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“supercelestial perfection” (sopraceleste perfettione) for it. So he went back to Heaven 
and “stole a spark of  the fire that the divinity enshrines in himself ” and secretly 
came back to the Earth to “hang it on the simulacrum.”60
Proud of  himself, Prometheus then returned to Heaven. Jupiter saw the light 
sparkling on the Earth, but realized that he would not be able to remove it without 
destroying the image itself. Therefore, he asked Vulcan to use a portion of  his 
“thickest smog” (densissima caligine) to cover that light. That is why the “intimate 
and intrinsic” science of  things has been lost, and any “extrinsic knowledge is in 
any case uncertain” (fu tolto all’huomo in tutto di sapere l’intrinseco delle cose: et l’estrinseco gli 
rimase incerto). In its pure nature only mathematics maintains the original certainty.61 
About Prometheus’s destiny and his damnation nothing is said.
4. conclusIon
Considering the fables in the Dialogues on Rhetoric, a couple of  conclusions can 
be drawn. Having created the Dialoghi, on its surface level, as a literary and fictional 
construction, which can also give place to argumentative writing, Patrizi resorts 
to fictional storytelling, presenting a short series of  “fables” based on material of  
Graeco-Roman mythology, in terms of  figures and situations. The sequence of  
the reigns of  Saturn and Jupiter, the fight against the Giants, the birth of  Fame, as 
well as Prometheus’ feats are the raw materials on which Patrizi builds his stories. 
These can be seen as a system: on the one side, the first broad representation 
of  the most ancient world, and the fall of  the Earth and of  mankind caused 
by the arrogance of  some, has its consequences made explicit by the last story 
concerning Jupiter’s revenge against his own images in the world. On the other 
side, the damnation of  mankind to (partial) ignorance is articulated in its various 
components, from the loss of  the denotative power of  words to the description 
of  the historical manipulation of  the art of  discourse. In fact, Patrizi’s quest for 
the essence of  rhetoric is rooted in a contrastive description of  its socio-historical 
use. The profile of  the “celestial Rhetoric” and its precepts takes its form from the 
polemic against the actual use of  deliberative and judicial oratory in particular.62
60 “Risalito in cielo, hebbe furato una scintilla del fuoco, della divinità, il quale ella in sé medesima, 
et non in altro vaso serba […] Et di nascosto, tornato in terra, l’apprese nella vita del simolacro,” 
ibid. fol. 51v.
61 Ibid. fol. 51v.
62 On the political implications of  Patrizi’s position, see Vasoli 1989, p. 91ff.
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 4, n.º 2 (2017): 243-263
Anna Laura Puliafito260
When not strictly argumentative, the language adopted in the Dialoghi makes 
an extensive use of  examples and ‘visual’ expressions—, in this sense consolidating 
the writing with a continual recourse to experience. Moreover, experience is 
the ground upon which Patrizi’s intellectual polemic is built. But the ultimate 
discovery of  the causes can hardly be said to take the form of  a purely rational 
argumentation; rather, Patrizi appeals to the suggestions of  a fictional original 
world, the story of  which can awake maraviglia (“marvelment”) and stupor as the 
two forms of  enchantment, positive and negative.
The authority of  the stories resides in their remote antiquity, the same 
ancient world that the stories themselves postulate as the golden age of  science 
and knowledge. In order to guarantee their truthfulness, the stories are always 
introduced by creating at least two more levels of  narration, which tend to exclude 
any element of  subjectivity: they are told by the old Ethiopian whome Castiglione 
meets, and are taken by from the most ancient Annals; or narrated to Patrizi in the 
dialogue by a magus; or represented to him in a dream or a vision, but recorded 
in the “oldest stories.” In any case, fictionality tends in the Dialoghi to be strictly 
linked to history, interpreted as an indirect experience of  the past. The narration is 
not merely a novella, as Patrizi’s interlocutors more than once suspect.63 Somehow, 
in this work, the plausibility of  the tales resides partly in the truthfulness of  the 
report and the authority of  the reporters, and partly in the intellectual superiority 
of  the audience, which permits the appropriate transmission of  the meaning: 
what the common folk take as simple entertainment can be rightly interpreted 
in its entirety by those who are pure and wise enough as to understand the real 
meaning underlying the covering of  the tale.
After the fall, the few who preserved a spark of  knowledge had to hide it 
from the rest of  the people, because they were aware of  the dangers of  the ill-
use of  knowledge itself. The ancient poets were in fact the first to transmit their 
science to others, choosing a way of  veiling and revealing at the same time. It was 
a wise form of  giving expression to mostly invisible and inconceivable thoughts, 
not a manipulation intended to cheat the audience; on the contrary, it was in fact 
the only way to safeguard the precious content of  their knowing.
63 See esp. the third dialogue (Il primo Tolomei, overo delle stesse materie oratorie, Patrizi 1562, 
fols.16r–21v: “An[tonio Tolomei]: Voi havete, o Patritio, dette queste cose, quasi in astratto; et 
havete dato vista, di voler andare, a nascondervi nelle nuvole delle novelle [...]. Pa[tritio]: Et voi 
fate certo, che io l’habbia detto ad uso dei Profeti, nol sapendo,” ibid. fol. 17v.
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Weaving argumentation and fiction, but presenting them on the level of  an 
imitative representation of  what is verisimilar and plausible, the whole construction 
of  the Dialoghi testifies, both in form and content, to the actual state of  human 
knowledge. Deprived of  the power of  the original language which united words 
and things, offering the possibility of  transmitting, and giving sensible form to 
the most intimate secrets of  nature and the soul, man cannot directly access the 
essences. But, as Patrizi claims when he concludes the fable of  Prometheus in the 
ninth dialogue, “if  we are aware that we cannot see with a deer’s or an eagle’s eye,” 
nevertheless we cannot pause to take care of  our eyes, “even if  they are bleary or 
damaged.” Nor because we are not given the “power of  a lion” can we “surrender 
to illness.”64 As if  to say that, beyond the enchanted “believing” elicited by the 
stories in the Dialogues, man’s task will be to discover and follow the path of  ‘right’ 
rational argumentation, the path of  a new, “celestial” rhetoric.
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